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1. INTRODUCTION 
The international monetary system (IMS) operates in a more complex world economy 
than in the past. On the one hand, international transactions occcur in more open and 
efficient  markets  and  large  monetary  unions  interact  with  flexible  exchange  rates. 
Furthermore, a significant number of European national currencies has been replaced by 
the euro, thus eliminating the risk of crises among legacy-currency countries. Finally, the 
process  of  industrialization  has  become  more  diffused  in  the  world,  as  a  result  of 
globalization and the decentralization of international investment. On the other hand, the 
IMS architecture appears incapable of delivering external balances—the current account 
of the balance of payments- and of facilitating smooth adjustments when imbalances are 
large and persistent. External imbalances last for two main reasons. The first is that their 
financing  is  made  easier  by  the  liberalized  capital  movements.  The  second  is  that 
exchange rate changes are not big enough to restore equilibrium in the current account. 
There is a convergence of interests for maintaining misaligned exchange rates. China and 
other emerging Asian economies, as well as Japan,  undervalue their currencies in relation 
to the dollar to boost a competitive advantage in their traded goods and to attract foreign 
direct investments. The United States accepts the overvaluation of the dollar because it 
can finance a large excess of domestic investment over domestic saving with foreign 
capital at low rates of interest. The soaring net foreign debt of the United States has yet to 
trigger a confidence crisis in the dollar. The equilibrium holds because the United States 
is keen in preserving the benefits of the key-currency and creditor countries are keen in 
avoiding capital losses on their rising dollar balances. This equilibrium, resulting from the 
convergence of interest of the two counterparties, is supported by the practice of surplus 
countries of sterilizing increases in the foreign component of the monetary base.    2 
The critical question is how long can such equilibrium last. While it is difficult to 
predict the timing of a crisis, the risk is rising that the equilibrium can collapse as a result 
of a shock in the U.S. financial markets or of a geo-political shock.  The shock could 
work its way through by sparking a confidence crisis in the dollar as a reserve currency 
that would instigate, in turn, large sales of  foreign owned dollar-denominated assets, 
sharp realignments of exchange rates and either a curtailment of capital inflows to the 
United States or a sharp rise in its cost of  foreign borrowing. Either  way, the  center 
country would have to quickly realign domestic consumption with domestic production 
with adverse consequences on economic growth at home and abroad. The policy reactions 
to  the  shock  could  be  further  complicated  by  anti-globalization  sentiments  and  a 
resurgence of protectionism. In sum, the existing equilibrium may be precarious and has 
the potential to unleash a world recession.  
Our paper resurrects the basic principles of the plan Keynes (1943) wrote for the 
Bretton Woods Conference to propose an alternative to the current IMS.  Here, in brief, 
are our main points. At this stage of  the IMS, there are (at least) two strategies. The first, 
discussed in Section 2 of the paper,  is a conservative strategy, aimed at maintaining the 
status  quo.  Historical  experience  suggests  that  the  IMS  must  be  centered  on  a  key-
currency issued by a dominant country with a deep financial market and a range of short-
term instruments accessible by nonresidents. Confidence crises in the key currency  are 
overcome  by  realignments  of  exchange  rates  and  cooperative  interventions  by  central 
banks.  The trouble with the conservative strategy is that there is no coherent plan on 
either stopping the deteriorating  dollar standard or of accelerating the replacement of the 
dollar by another key currency. The euro is the natural candidate, but financial and more 
importantly political integration in Euroland is still incomplete.    3 
The alternative strategy, discussed in Section 3, is a  proactive one. This strategy 
rests ultimately on a supranational money, but not as a starting point. The underlying 
assumption of the proactive strategy is that the costs of adopting gradually a supranational 
monetary system are less than the expected costs related to the collapse of the existing 
IMS. The alternative strategy rests on the fundamental principles of the Keynes Plan, 
namely gradualism, banking approach, complementarity, multilateralism, and symmetry 
of adjustment. Bancor lost to the dollar at Bretton Woods, not because of any intellectual 
inferiority,  but  because  the  United  States  was  the  dominant  power  and  the  large  net 
creditor of the war-ravaged rest of the world. Yet, some of  the ideas of the Keynes Plan 
have reemerged among U.S. policy makers whenever the dollar has been under strain and 
the United States has sought cooperative solutions to get out of the impasse (James 1996, 
ch.  13).    Given  the  extreme  U.S.  external  imbalance  and  the  risk  of  sharper  dollar 
depreciation in the exchange markets, it would seem that a proactive strategy would be 
received with some interest by the center country.  
In Section 4 of the paper, we draw from the Keynes Plan to propose a supranational 
bank money (SBM) created by a New International Clearing Union (New ICU) against 
short-term  domestic  assets  provided  by  the  Federal  Reserve  System  (Fed)  and  the 
European Central Bank (ECB).  The spirit of the Keynes Plan is preserved in that the 
New ICU would operate with multilateral settlements of debit and credit entries among 
central banks and would extend temporary credit to deficit countries. The New ICU could 
be established either as a separate institution or imbedded within an existing international 
organization  such  as  the  International  Monetary  Fund  or  the  Bank  for  International 
Settlements. 
  
   4 
2.  THE CONSERVATIVE STRATEGY 
From Bretton Woods to the dollar standard 
Bretton Woods broke down because the center country, the United States, was unwilling 
to provide a stable inflation rate to the system. The center country abused the privileges 
emanating from its national currency functioning also as the key international currency. 
U.S.  monetary  authorities,  when  faced  with  stark  choices  between  domestic  and 
international objectives, placed the former above the latter. Triffin (1960) was the first to 
recognize the fundamental flaw of the gold-dollar standard. Given the relative fixity of 
monetary  gold,  the  demand  for  international  liquidity  was  primarily  satisfied  by  the 
reserve  country  issuing  short-term,  liquid,  dollar-denominated  liabilities.  Yet,  two 
moneys  linked  by  fixed  official  exchange  rates  fall  prey  to  Gresham’s  Law.  Under 
Bretton Woods, gold became the scarce  money.
1 The dollar conversion clause became 
increasingly non-credible as dollar liquid liabilities rose relative to the U.S. owned gold 
stock.
2 Attempts to share the burden of the dollar conversion clause with other central 
banks, through the operation of the Gold Pool, did not last. Ultimately the burden fell 
predominantly  on  the  United  States.  A  Gentlemen’s  Agreement  of  not  exercising  the 
conversion clause had also ephemeral effects. The incentives of each player to deviate 
from the objective of preserving the system were overwhelming.  
  France was a particularly recalcitrant player in objecting to the “exorbitant privilege” 
that  the  United  States  enjoyed  as  a  result  of  having  an  international  currency.  The 
corollary of the “exorbitant privilege” principle was that the United States could embark 
on expansionist policies without suffering balance-of-payments crises to which all other 
                                                 
1 The price of gold was set at the 1934 value of $35 dollars per ounce and remained constant even 
though  the  Bretton  Woods  Agreement  envisioned  a  price  change  in  case  of  a  fundamental 
disequilibrium. 
2 In the 1960s the United States lost almost half of its gold stock.   5 
countries were instead subject. The guns-and-butter policies of the United States in the 
1960s were a prime example of this soft budget constraint. 
  The issuer of an international currency bears costs as well. These arise from the 
provision of  a stable purchasing power of the currency and the constraints placed on the 
central bank to achieve such a stability. In particular, exchange rate stability must be more 
important  than  objectives  of  high  employment  and  output  stabilization.  If  domestic 
objectives instead prevail, the reserve currency country abuses its privileges and deviates 
from the long-run solution. The United States, ultimately, found the costs of  being a 
reserve currency country too large relative to the benefits of having a key currency and 
produced  an  inflation  rate  that  was  neither  consistent  with  the  fixed  dollar-gold 
conversion price nor with the preferences of major players like Germany (Fratianni and 
Hauskrecht 1998).  
While Bretton Woods is long gone, the United States still enjoys the benefits of  a 
key currency. One benefit is that foreign monetary authorities are willing to accumulate 
U.S.  liquid  dollar  liabilities,  primarily  in  the  form  of  U.S.  government  securities  and 
dollar  deposits  with  U.S.  banks.
3  The  result  is  that  the  United  States  can  finance  its 
Federal debt at a lower cost than if its currency were not also an international currency. 
The “interest rate subsidy,” in turn,  gives the  U.S. government an incentive to either 
expand expenditures for given tax rates or reduce tax rates for given expenditures. U.S. 
budget deficits, or net government dissaving,  rise. Unless the private sector offsets  the 
higher  government  dissaving  with  higher  net  saving,  the  country  as  a  whole  will 
experience a decline in saving over investment and, consequently, a rise in the current-
                                                 
3 For an interpretation of the United States behaving as the world’s banker (borrowing short and 
lending  long),  see  Depres,  Kindleberger,  and  Salant  (1966); for  an interpretation  of  the  U.S. 
banking system behaving as the world’s central bank, see Fratianni and Savona (1972).   6 
account deficit. Thus, in the absence of  Ricardian equivalence, the interest rate subsidy 
implies higher current-account deficits and larger foreign debt.  
 
Same play with new actors 
An  important  school  of  thought,  led  by  Dooley,  Folkerts-Landau  and  Garber  (2003), 
believes that the current IMS behaves substantively like the old Bretton Woods system; in 
other  words  the  conservative  strategy  continues.  The  periphery  countries  of  the  old 
Bretton Woods have graduated to a regime of flexible exchange rates but new actors have 
appeared on the scene and are playing the role of the old actors. Asia is the new periphery 
of the system and pursues an export-led development strategy. The new periphery pegs 
their  currencies  to  the  dollar  at  an  undervalued  rate.  In  contrast,  the  old  periphery  --
consisting of Europe, Canada and parts of Latin America-- interacts with the center with 
flexible exchange rates. The United States, for its part, has no exchange rate policy. The 
different  strategies  of  the  two  peripheries  yield  different  propensities  to  accumulate 
dollar-denominated foreign reserves. The old periphery has dismantled controls on capital 
flows and on the foreign  exchange market and focuses on optimizing returns and risk on 
its net foreign assets. It worries about the sustainability of  U.S. current account deficits 
and foreign debt. The new periphery, by contrast, cares mostly about exporting to the 
United States, has extensive controls on capital flows and the foreign exchange market 
and cares little about returns and risk on its net foreign assets. It is willing to accumulate 
rising amounts of U.S. short-term liabilities at prevailing exchange rates.  
In  this  triangular  relationship,  the  excess  of  U.S.    investment  over  saving  is 
financed by the excess of  saving over investment of the new periphery. The latter is 
willing  to  finance  the  excess  of    U.S.  consumption  over  production  so  long  as  it  is 
guaranteed access to its market. The risk of a sudden dollar depreciation and of capital   7 
losses  on  the  accumulated  dollar  reserves  is  deemed  secondary.  The  new  periphery 
believes that it is in the interest of the U.S. government not to disturb this equilibrium, for 
the alternative implies a rise in U.S. interest rates and a U.S. recession. On the other hand, 
the old periphery balances its domestic saving with domestic investment and has stopped 
accumulating  dollar-denominated  international  reserves  by  having  adopted  flexible 
exchange rates. 
There is some merit in this interpretation of the international monetary system. 
Table 1 shows that the large and rising current-account deficits of the United States are to 
a  significant  extent  offset  by  the  current-account  surpluses  of  China,  Japan  and  oil-
exporting countries. The current account of the euro area, on the other hand, has been 
roughly  on  balance.  These  external  imbalances  reflect  differences  in  saving  and 
investment. In the United States, saving as a ratio of GDP (S/Y) has been steadily falling 
since 2001, while investment as a ratio of GDP (I/Y) has risen, albeit slightly. In 2006, 
I/Y exceeded S/Y by 6.3 percentage points; see IMF (2007, Table 43). S/Y and I/Y of the 
newly industrialized Asian economies are almost a mirror image of those in the United 
States. In the euro area, S/Y and I/Y are roughly in line with each other. 
[Insert Table 1 and 2 here]  
  Table  2  undescores  the  propensity  of    the  new  periphery  to  set  undervalued 
exchange  rates  with  respect  to  the  dollar  and  to  accumulate  foreign  reserves.  This 
propensity has risen dramatically since the start of the new millennium and has financed a 
growing share of  US current-account deficits.
4 These data understate the true extent of 
central  bank  financing  of  US  current-account  deficits  because  central  banks  use  also 
anonymous  transactions  in  their    foreign  exchange  market  interventions  (Roubini  and 
                                                 
4 In 2000, foreign monetary authorities accumulated $43 billion of  dollar reserves against a U.S. 
deficit of  $417 billion; in 2006, the accumulation of dollar reserves was a whopping $440 billion 
against a U.S. deficit of $811 billion.   8 
Setser 2005, p. 6).  Figure 1 displays  total holdings of foreign exchange or the stock of 
international reserves. These reserves have been growing  at an average annual rate of 11 
per cent over the period from 1995 to mid 2007,  with a sharp acceleration taking place 
since 2003 when China began  increasing sharply its stock of international reserves. At 
the end of 2002, Chinese reserves were $ 286 billion; two years later they more than 
doubled  to  $610  billion;  two  years  later  they  almost  doubled  again  to  $1066  billion; 
during the first half of 2007 they rose by more than $ 300 billion. The upshot is that the 
Chinese share of international reserves in the world has gone from 5.3 per cent in 1995 to 
26.4 per cent in 2007.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The softness of the US external constraint can be measured by the proportion of  
U.S. imports of goods and services plus income payments financed by increases of U.S. 
liquid  assets  (primarily  short-term  US  government  securities  and  deposits  with  U.S. 
banks) held by foreign monetary authorities; see Figure 2. For almost half a century, 
foreign central banks financing has accounted, on average, for approximately 6.5 per cent 
of total US imports, but have been higher when the dollar has been weak against major 
currencies and lower when the dollar has been strong; see Figure 3. Financing ratio rose 
up to 40 per cent in the first half of the seventies in concomitance with the end of Bretton 
Woods and the first oil shock; declined to less than one per cent as the dollar experienced 
a sizeable appreciation in the first half of the eighties; rose again with the depreciation of 
the dollar after 1985;  settled to an average of 4 per cent in the nineties and rose to an 
excess of 15 per cent with the latest dollar weakness.  
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 here]   9 
Dooley et al. believe that the system can continue as it is for quite some time. 
Roubini and Setser believe that the system has a high risk of unravelling soon.
5 Among 
the reasons for a quick end, these authors mention the distortions arising in the United 
States from excessive consumption and employment in interest-sensitive sectors, an over 
supply of  non-tradable and an under supply of tradable goods, the difficulty of  sterilizing 
large purchases of dollar assets by China so as to keep inflation under control, and the 
rising risk of capital losses on dollar reserves.  
Eichengreen (2004) also finds the system unstable for a variety of reasons but the 
most  important  being  the  following  three.  The  first  is  that  the  new  periphery  is  less 
cohesive  and  less  homogenous  than  the  old  Bretton  Woods    periphery.  The  Asian 
countries  do  not  share  the  historical  background  and  institution  building  of  post-war 
Europe and are less inclined to create suitable collective-action mechanisms aimed at 
preserving the current system. Bretton Woods, in full operation, lasted a little more than a 
decade, from 1958 to 1971  The new Bretton Woods  is likely to break down sooner. The 
second is that, today, the world has in the euro an attractive alternative to the dollar, 
whereas under Bretton Woods the alternative to the dollar was a moribund pound. The 
exit of a dollar standard is less costly today than in the sixties.  The third is the weaker 
commitment of the center country to preserve the value of its liabilities. Under Bretton 
Woods the United States was committed to convert dollars into gold at a fixed price; no 
such commitment exists today. In fact, US policies can be best characterized as benign 




                                                 
5 The actual prediction is that  “there is a meaningful risk the Bretton Woods 2 system will 
unravel before the end of 2006” (p. 3).    10 
3.  A PROACTIVE STRATEGY 
At the root of the problem is an IMS that cannot find a stable international money that 
would not only fulfill the traditional functions of accounting unit, means of payments and 
store of value, but also guarantee symmetric,  yet smooth, adjustments by surplus and 
deficit  countries  alike.  The  gold-exchange  standard,  chosen  at  Bretton  Woods,  was  a 
second best compromise by electing the national currency of the dominant country to 
become the reserve currency of the system, albeit with a gold convertibility clause. As we 
have seen in the previous section, the asymmetry deriving from the dual role of the dollar 
as both a national  and international currency proved to be unstable in the long run. The 
ensuing dollar standard has been even more asymmetric than the gold-dollar system: the 
center country has continued to operate with an even softer external constraint and has 
gained the added benefit of  having been released from the gold convertibility obligation.  
The notion that the ideal IMS should be linked to a supranational money has been a 
recurrent theme of the literature ever since the Keynes Plan.
6  The principles of this Plan 
remain timely because the fundamental causes of the instability of  the IMS that Keynes 
tried to address in his Plan are as valid today as they were in the early Forties; and were 
subsequently  confirmed  by  the  crisis  of  the  gold-dollar  standard.  Furthermore,  the 
structural changes that have impacted the world economy make the reform of the IMS 
more urgent and more feasible along the lines of Keynes’ principles.   
                                                 
6  Early writers inspired by Keynes include Triffin, Bernstein, Day, among others; see Grubel 
(1963), Machlup (1966) and Horsefield (1969). The latest are Alessandrini (2007) and Costabile 
(2007). Nobel Laureate Robert Mundell (2005, p. 475) concludes advocating an extreme form of 
supranational fiduciary money: “[a] world currency [that] would level the playing field for big 
and small countries alike.” Mundell is aware that this is an ultimate goal that can  be obtained 
only at an unforeseeable end of a long-term evolution. However, it should be noted that one world 
money in the present context  is not only utopia but also hard to justify on  economical grounds. 
To begin with, the experience of European monetary unification proves that levelling the playing 
field  is  a  pre-condition  rather  than  an  outcome  of  monetary  integration.  The  process  of 
convergence at the world level appears insurmountable, economically and above all politically. 
Furthermore, one monetary policy applied to vastly heterogeneous countries is inefficient and 
amplifies divergences between strong and weak countries.   11 
 
Keynesian principles 
In the Treatise on Money Keynes argued that the ideal solution for the IMS (which he 
called  the  “maximum”  arrangement)  is  the  constitution  of  a  supranational  bank  of 
national central banks:  
“Its assets should consist of gold, securities and advances to central banks, and its 
liabilities of deposits by central banks. Such deposits we will call supernational bank 
money (or S.B.M for short)”  (Keynes 1930, p.358).  
 
At the same time, Keynes was conscious of the difficulties of  realizing this project: 
 “Is the system of supernational currency management of the future to be born ready-
made or gradually evolved? Probably the latter” (Keynes 1930, p.354).  
 
These  two  citations  imbed  the  important  principles  of  gradualism  and  the  banking 
approach.  By  gradualism  Keynes  meant  flexibility  in  accepting  lower  degrees  of 
“supernational  management”  so  long  as  improvements  were  envisioned  in  the  future 
towards the ultimate goal. As a case in point, Keynes redrafted the Plan five times to 
make it more politically acceptable.
7 He gave his approval to the final Agreement signed 
at  Bretton  Woods,  so  significantly  different  from  his  Plan,  with  his  famous  dog 
metaphor.
8 On one principle, however, Keynes would not compromise, namely that the 
IMS would create “…the least possible interference with internal national policies”  under 
an open regime of international trade (Keynes 1943, p. 19).
9 
                                                 
7 The first draft was dated September 8, 1941; the last one, which we refer as Keynes (1943), was 
issued by the British Government as a White Paper in April, 1943; see Horsefield (1969) and 
Moggridge (1980).  
8 The metaphor was used by Keynes in his speech delivered to the House of Lords on May 23, 
1944: “The loss of the dog we need not too much regret, though I still think that it was a more 
thoroughbred animal than what has now come out from a mixed marriage of ideas. Yet, perhaps, 
as sometimes occurs, this dog of mixed origin is a sturdier and more serviceable animal.” 
9 This objective was constantly recalled by Keynes: “It is the policy … directed to an optimum 
level of domestic employment which is twice blessed in the sense that it helps ourselves and our 
neighbours at the same time. And it is the simultaneous pursuit of these policies by all countries 
together which is capable of restoring economic health and strength internationally” (Keynes 
1936, p. 349).   12 
Keynes relied on the banking approach to find the best compromise between the 
requirements of financing external imbalances and the obligation of surplus and deficit 
countries to correct them.  For that he envisioned a supranational settlement system, 
the  International  Clearing  Union  (ICU),  where  national  central  banks  would  keep 
deposits denominated in bancor, the supranational money valued in terms of gold at 
fixed but alterable exchange rates. Bancors were to be created against gold (Gicu) 
delivered by the member countries to the ICU and overdraft facilities (OD) extended 
by ICU to deficit-country central banks. The balance sheet of ICU can be written as 
 (1)       Gicu +  ∑OD    =      ∑ bancor,   
where ∑ sums over the n participating central banks.  We have expressed  (1)  in terms of 
the ith currency by defining one bancor equal to one unit of gold and the spot exchange 
rate between the ith currency and bancor also being  equal to one.  
Whereas the creation of bancors through transfers of gold to the ICU does not alter 
the stock of monetary base in the world, their creation through the overdraft facility does. 
The ICU activates OD when a deficit country has depleted its initial stock of bancors: the 
deficit country borrows from the ICU and bancors are credited to the surplus country. 
This mechanism is the direct outcome of the banking approach adopted by the Keynes 
Plan  and  paves  the  way  to  the  other  Keynesian  principles  of  complementarity, 
multilateralism, and symmetric responsibility of adjustment. To see this point, consider 
the balance sheet of the ith central bank expressed in its own currency: 
(2)     Bancor + OR  + D   =   B  + OD,  
where the stock of bancor supplements other international reserves, OR, the monetary 
base is denoted by B and its domestic component by D.    13 
Under the Keynes Plan, bancor gradually replaces gold and deemphasizes the role 
of key currencies without emasculating them.
 10  National currencies retain their means-
of-payment function, are used as intervention currencies by the monetary authorities in 
the exchange markets, and are counted as reserve assets:  
“Central banks can deal direct with one another as heretofore. No transaction in 
bancor will take place except when a member State or its Central Bank is exercising 
the right to pay in it (…). Thus the fabric on international banking organization… 
would be left as undisturbed as possible” (Keynes 1943, p. 29). 
 
Define  now  with  BP  a  balance-of-payments  imbalance  on  an  official  settlement 
basis. This definition implies that central banks intervene in the exchange markets using a 
key  currency,  say  the  dollar,  to  stabilize  exchange  rates.  In  the  normal  bilateral 
settlements, a deficit-country central bank (BP < 0) loses dollar-denominated assets while 
a surplus-country central bank (BP > 0) gains them. Under the bancor system, the deficit 
country  can exercise the right to pay in bancor by drawing down on its stock of bancors 
or  by  increasing  its  OD  exposure  with  the  ICU.  The  surplus  country  would  see  an 
increase in its stock of bancors or a decrease in its OD exposure with the ICU. Thus, 
bilateral credits and debits are multilateralized.  
Under the Keynesian multilateral principle all countries are treated symmetrically 
vis-à-vis the ICU. This applies also to the key-currency country, which loses much of its 
privilege  of  financing  external  deficit  with  its  own  currency  because  reserve  assets 
denominated  in  the  key  currency  are  limited  to  “working  balances  for  the  daily 
management” in the exchange markets.
11 Creditor-country central banks can exchange 
bancors for dollar-denominated assets (say US T-bills) at the ICU, which would then 
                                                 
10 Keynes proposed a gradual demonetization of gold through one-way convertibility from gold 
into bancors. He left the decision to the discretion of central banks, hoping in the increasing 
preference for bancor. This prudence can be explained by the desire of Keynes not to alienate the 
United States, the major holder of gold. 
11 “The monetary reserves of a member State, viz., the Central Bank or other bank or Treasury 
deposits in excess of a working balance, shall not be held in another country except with the 
approval of the monetary authorities of that country” (Keynes 1943, p. 24).   14 
charge the bancor account of  the Fed. In the end, the creditor-country central bank has 
more bancors and fewer U.S. T-bills, while the Fed has fewer bancors (or more OD) and 
a  smaller  monetary  base.  Thus,  the  key  currency  country  faces  an  external  balance 
constraint related to its bancor position. This is a key result of the Keynes Plan that has 
not been fully understood and may be worthwhile elaborating it further. As an example, 
let the ECB be the creditor central bank that wants to replace $100 worth of U.S. T-bills 
with bancors. The ECB sells the T-bills to Citicorp for $100 dollar deposit. The ECB then 
instructs Citicorp to transfer the deposit with the Fed, a transaction that implies a decline 
of $ 100 in U.S. bank reserves and U.S. monetary base, while the Fed’s total liabilities 
remain unchanged.
12 Finally, the ECB instructs the Fed to sell the $100 dollar deposit for 
an equivalent amount of bancors. At this point, the ICU would credit the ECB with $100 
worth  of  bancors  and  debit  the  Fed’s  bancor  account  for  the  same  amount.  The 
substitution of bancors for dollar-denominated reserves implies, not only  a decline of the 
monetary base in the United States, but also a fall in the stock of supranational bank 
money and a hardening of the external constraint. Unless the United States counteracts 
such  a  decline,  the  conversion  of  dollar  assets  into  international  money  sets  off  an 
adjustment process. It also follows that the the n – 1 redundancy problem (Mundell 1968, 
pp, 143-47 and 195-98) that leaves one degree of freedom to the key-currency country 
disappears under the bancor system.
13 
The Keynes Plan solution for financing balance-of-payments deficits is solved with 
a  supply  of  international  liquidity  through  ICU  that  adapts  endogenously  to  demand. 
However,  bancors  created  through  OD  raise  only  temporarily  the  stock  of  the  world 
monetary base. As surplus and deficit countries adjust their imbalances, their stocks of 
                                                 
12  This  is  because  the  reduction  in the  U.S.  monetary  base  is  compensated by  an  equivalent 
increase in foreign deposit owned by the ECB at the Fed.  According to McKinnon (1974, p. 16; 
1996, pp. 173-4), under the dollar standard the Fed enjoys an automatic stabilization. 
13 On this, read Alessandrini (2007).   15 
bancors  return  to  the  initial  value.  Keynes  stressed  the  principle  of  symmetric 
responsibility: surplus and deficit countries must share the burden of adjustment. The  
rule of not sterilizing changes in the foreign component of the monetary base do just that; 
in equation (2) changes in bancor or OD cannot be offset by changes in D. On the other 
hand,  Keynes  was  opposed  to  the  blind  application  of  this  rule  to  the  point  of 
subordinating domestic equilibrium to the external one.
14  In his view, the rules of the 
game should be managed in the mutual interests of surplus and deficit countries so as to 
finance external disequilibria in the short run and to allow enough time for the adjustment 
process. The implication was that sterilization was acceptable in the short run if domestic 
circumstances warranted and that shared responsibility of adjustment did not necessarily 
mean  contemporaneous  adjustment.  The  sequence  and  timing  of  the  adjustment  was 
dictated by the need “to offset deflationary or inflationary tendencies in effective world 
demand” (Keynes 1943, p. 20).
15 
In  the  Keynes  Plan  the  size  of  financing,  through  the  overdraft  facility,    is 
constrained by quotas assigned to participating countries.
16 Bancor balances that deviate 
from the quotas are discouraged. The Plan introduces a penalty interest rate on excessive 
positive and negative bancor balances.
17 Furthermore, there are quantitative limits that are 
binding for debtor countries and non-compulsory for creditor countries. The participation 
                                                 
14 “The disadvantage is that it hampers each Central Bank in tackling its own national problems, 
interferes with pioneer improvements of policy (…), and does nothing to secure either the short-
period or the long-period optimum if the average behaviour is governed by blind forces such as 
the total quantity of gold” (Keynes 1930, p. 256). 
15 On the division of the burden of adjustment, see Mundell (1968, ch.13  and Appendix B of ch. 
20). 
16 For Keynes, quotas are calculated as the average of exports and imports of goods and services. 
In a world of free capital movements, the definition could be extended to include capital flows. 
17 “These charges are not absolutely essential to the scheme. But…they would be valuable and 
important  inducements  towards  keeping  a  level  balance,  and  a  significant  indication  that  the 
system looks on excessive credit balances with as critical an eye as on excessive debit balances, 
each being, indeed, the inevitable concomitant of the other” (Keynes 1943, p. 23).    16 
of creditor countries in the adjustment process poses the greatest challenge.
18 These 
countries must be convinced to accept bancors in the short run, but not to hoard them 
in the long run. Yet,  Keynes is optimistic: 
“The substitution of a credit mechanism in place of a hoarding would have repeated 
in the international field the same miracle already performed in the domestic field, 
of turning a stone into bread” (Keynes 1943, p.27).  
 
This aspect of the Keynes Plan is weak and also contradictory, as Robertson points 
out: "Are we to love, honour, cherish and thank or to kick in the bottom the blokes who 
hold  bancor?"
19  The  difficulty  lies  in  not  having  a  supranational  central  bank  with 
autonomous control over the creation of monetary base and with decision-making power 
in  applying  the  rules  of  the  game.  But  such  an  institution  would  not  be  accepted, 
especially  by  dominant  countries.  The  problem  is  only  partially  alleviated  by  the 
Keynesian flexible approach to the rules of game. But a managed flexibility cannot be 
based  on  the  “miracle”  of  an  informal  “collective  responsibility”  to  obtain  the  best 
compromise between domestic full employment and international stability.  
 
4. OUR PROPOSAL   
The feasible alternative to an unfeasible autonomous supranational central bank is to 
create a cooperative agreement among a restricted group of key countries that find it in 
their interest to share responsibility to stabilize the IMS. Theory and practice suggests 
that cooperation is more likely the smaller the number of and the more homogeneous 
are  the  participating  countries.  There  are  some  historical  precedents  of  monetary 
cooperation among the few. In 1936, the United States, the United Kingdom and France 
signed  the  Tripartite  Agreement  that  had  the  objective  of  exchange  rate  stability  by 
imposing mutual responsibility on creditor and debtor countries (Horsefield 1969, volume 
                                                 
18 On the difficulties to share the burden of adjustment, see Kindleberger (1979) . 
19 Minute to Keynes dated 3 March 1943, see Moggridge (1980. p.215).   17 
I, p.6-10). Bretton Woods, while signed by many countries, came about through the 
cooperative effort of two key countries, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Between 1985 and 1987, the G-5 group of countries, composed of the United States, 
Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, cooperated on exchange rate targets 
between 1985 and 1987 (from the so-called Plaza to the Louvre agreements).  
  Our proposal starts with a bilateral agreement between the Fed and the ECB 
before expanding the agreement to include China. As shown in section 2, China has  
large current-account surpluses and the Chinese central bank owns over a quarter of the 
world’s international reserves. The agreement between the Fed and the ECB involves 
the establishment of a clearing institution, called the New ICU, that would operate as in 
the Keynes Plan with multilateral settlements of debit and credit entries among central 
banks and overdraft facilities.
20 The New ICU would issue supranational bank money, 
SBM, as in Keynes but with the significant difference that SBMs would be backed only 
by domestic earning assets and not by gold.
21 SBMs are created by the Fed and the ECB 
by swapping part of their domestic component of the monetary base for SBMs. The swap 
does not alter the world’s monetary base. 
SBMs,  like  bancors,  differ  from  SDRs  in  the  fundamental  way  that  SBMs  are 
created  on  the  initiative  of  the  participating  countries,  whereas  SDRs  are  created 
exogenously by the IMF as a sort of international helicopter money.
22 SDRs have failed 
to  replace  the  dollar  as  “the  principal  reserve  asset  in  the  international  monetary 
system.”
23  
                                                 
20 The European Payments Union applied the principles of the international clearing union, except 
the use of a supranational money. It operated from 1950 to 1958 and led to the convertibility of 
the European currencies; see Yeager (1968, pp. 363-377) and James (1996, pp. 76-77 and 95-99). 
21  To  emphasize  the  difference  from  Keynes’  bancor  plan  we  use  the  denomination  SBM,  
“supernational bank money”, used in the Treatise on Money (Keynes 1930). 
22 Since the Rio Agreement of 1967, there have been only two relatively small distributions of 
SDRs. 
23  This is reflected in the IMF Articles of Agreement; see Kenen (1981, p.403).   18 
By allowing central banks to exchange SBMs for accumulated dollar-denominated 
assets  (and,  in  principle,  also  international  reserves  denominated  in  other  national 
currencies), the New ICU imbeds the spirit of the Triffin Plan (1960) and other authors 
who  have  proposed  the  centralization  of  international  money.
24  The  New  ICU  also 
incorporates the principles of the Substitution Account, first discussed by the Committee 
of Twenty (1974) and later reconsidered by the Interim Committees of the IMF in 1978-
79.
25  The  Substitution  Account  never  came  to  light  because  the  United  States  was 
unwilling to bear the exchange rate risk arising from an unhedged position of the Fund 
having  dollar  assets  and  SDR  liabilities  (Boughton  2001,  ch.  18).  Furthermore,  the 
Substitution Account did not resolve the automatic sterilization of U.S. liabilities. Had the 
Substitution Account been implemented, we would have avoided the large overhang of 
dollar reserves that now  threatens the durability of the international dollar standard.  
In  our  proposal,  the  twin  problem  of  exchange  rate  risk  on  dollar  assets  and  
automatic  sterilization  is  resolved.  The  New  ICU  does  not  bear  exchange  rate  risk 
because it does not hold open positions in assets denominated in national currencies. As 
we have already noted, creditor-country central banks exchange SBMs for dollar reserves 
by selling dollar assets in the open market and by converting dollar deposits at the Fed 
with SBMs at the New ICU. There are no official unhedged positions and the monetary 
base of the Fed fully reflects the conversion of SBMs for dollar assets.  
    
New ICU 
For simplicity, we assume that there are three dominant countries in the world: the United 
States, the Euro area, and China. The dollar and the euro are key currencies and the 
central banks of these two key-currency countries, the Fed and the ECB, agree to create 
                                                 
24 See the exhaustive review essay written by Machlup (1966, pp. 319-339). 
25 On this, see Kenen (1981) and Micossi and Saccomanni (1981).   19 
New ICU that issues SBMs backed by dollar and euro domestic assets. The Fed and the 
ECB transfer a portion of their domestic assets, αD$ and βDє respectively, to New ICU 
and receive in exchange SBM. SBM, unlike Keynes’ bancor, is a currency basket backed 
by  earning  assets  and  has  properties  that  are  similar  to  the  SDRs  and  the  European 
Currency Unit. It is equal to a fixed amount of  dollars and euros, q$ = αD$ and qє = βDє, 
respectively.  SBM, like bancor, circulates only among central banks, at least in the first 
stages, and its value can be expressed in any of the three currencies: 
(3)     SBM 
j =  Sj$(q$) + Sjє(qє), 
where Sji  is the exchange rate between j and i defined as number of units of j per unit of i. 
Suppose, for convenience, that SBM is measured in dollars, then the balance sheet of 
New ICU becomes: 
 (4)   αD$ + S$єβDє = SBM. 
The exchange of international money for domestic assets does not alter the monetary base 
of the Fed and the ECB; it simply alters its distribution. For example, the Fed’s monetary 
base, after the exchange, would appear as follows: 
(5) B$  = (1- α)D$ + OR$ + SBM$, 
where  SBM$  denotes  the  amount  of  SBM  owned  by  the  Fed,  valued  in  dollars,  and 
obtained in exchange of  αD$. As in balance sheet (2), OR$ denotes other international 
reserves. 
 New ICU operates in the spirit of Keynes’ ICU. Again, define balance-of-payments 
surpluses and deficits in terms of the official settlement concept. As  an example, we 
assume that the Euro area is in balance and that China has a surplus equal to γSBM$;  
China’s surplus is the U.S. deficit.  The Chinese central bank intervenes in the exchange 
markets and purchases dollar assets that are exchanged for SBM by drawing down the 
Fed’s account with New ICU:   20 
(6)   αD$ +  S$єβDє =  (1- γ)SBM$ +  γSBMc+  SBMє, for  0< γ<1. 
The total stock of SBM has remained the same. Part of the Fed’s SBM endowment is 
transferred  to  the  central  bank  of  China.  U.S.  liabilities,  purchased  by  China  in  the 
exchange market, are sold back on the open market to obtain SBMs; see our discussion on 
the Substitution  Account in the previous section of the paper. China replaces dollar assets 
with an interest rate i$ with an asset with an interest rate iSBM = i$ (q$) + iє(qє); but more 
importantly, China swaps more volatile dollars for less volatile SBMs. The position of 
New ICU remains hedged since neither the assets nor the liabilities have changed. The 
monetary  base  of  the  central  bank  of  China  expands  and  that  of  the  Fed  contracts, 
assuming that the parties adhere to the rules of the game. Surplus and deficit countries 
share the burden of adjustment, as prescribed by Keynes.  
  Next, assume γ > 1. The United States has an inadequate stock of SBMs to settle 
its balance-of-payments deficit. As in the Keynes Plan, New ICU has the authority to 
extend a loan, in the form of an overdraft, to the United States. The value of this overdraft 
is the excess of Chinese intervention with respect to the stock of SBM owned by the 
United States, (γ -1)SBM$ = OD$.  We are assuming in this case that the overdraft falls 
within the quota; New ICU’s balance sheet would look like: 
(7)   αD$ + SjєβDє + OD$ =  γSBMc +  SBMє,          for γ>1. 
With the overdraft, the stock of SBM has expanded. This expansion was to be temporary 
for Keynes; it serves the purpose of giving the deficit country time to adjust. We recall 
that  Keynes  insisted  that  the  external  adjustment  would  not  come  at  the  expense  of 
internal equilibrium. Thus, the rules of the game can become more complex depending on  
economic  conditions,  as  shown  in  section  3.  If  inflation  prevails,  the    burden  of 
adjustment falls primarily on the deficit country. If unemployment prevails, the burden of   21 
adjustment falls primarily on  the surplus country. New ICU has a hedged position and 
does not incur in exchange rate losses or gains.  
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our proposal to reform the IMS and applied to a few critical countries  has at least two 
recent precedents in the literature. The first is McKinnon (1974) who, soon after the 
demise of Bretton Woods,  envisaged a tripartite agreement among the United States, 
Germany, and Japan to stabilize the relative prices of their currencies; this plan was 
then updated after the Plaza-Louvre Accord (McKinnon 1996, ch. 22). The basic idea 
was that the G-3 group of leading coutries would agree to harmonize their national 
monetary  policies  by  partially  sterilizing  their  interventions  in  the  foreign  exchange 
markets.  The  second  is  Mundell  (2005)  who  recommends  a  central  bank  monetary 
union among the Fed, the ECB and the Bank of Japan.
26 These central banks would 
manage their currencies as a “platform on which to base a multilateral world currency 
on which every country would have a share” (Mundell 2005, p. 473). A world currency 
would be the final step in the evolutionary process of the redesigned IMS. Our proposal 
differs  from  both  alternatives.  It  is  more  expansive  than  McKinnon’s  in  that  we 
introduce  a  supranational  money,  whereas  McKinnon’s  plan  does  not.  It  is  more 
restrictive  than  Mundell’s  in  that  our  supranational  money  coexists  with  national 
currencies (key as well as non-key currencies), whereas Mundell’s plan contemplates a 
central bank union and ultimately one money in the world. Our position, elaborated in 
the paper, is that an agreement among key-currency countries without a supranational 
money would not generate a sufficiently robust mechanism for countries to adjust to 
                                                 
26 Mundell (2005, p. 472) recognizes that  “… these areas are too different to have a monetary 
union. But in terms of economic reality, there are much more similar than the twelve countries 
that now make up the EMU.”   22 
external imbalances. On the other hand, we judge a clearing union to be more feasible 
than a central bank union. 
Any  reform  proposal  must  be  judged  by  the  incentives  to  reform  and 
consequently the likelihood of adoption.  There is a broad consensus that the current, 
large U.S. current-account deficits financed with foreign capital inflows at low interest 
rates cannot continue forever; there is much less consensus on when the system is likely 
to  end  and  how  badly  it  will  end.  Over  the  short  run,  China  is  the  critical  player  in 
bringing about changes. The United States have no immediate interest in stopping the 
benefits  from    excessive  consumption  financed  with  low  interest  rate  capital  inflows. 
Over the longer run, however, the United States may feel otherwise for three reasons. The 
first is the deterioration in the brand name of the dollar and  the erosion in the market 
share of dollar-denominated assets in official foreign exchange reserves and in global 
financial  markets.  Short-run  gains  from  excessive  consumption  would  come  at  the 
expense of longer term losses due portfolio diversification away from the dollar by the 
new periphery. The current U.S. policy of fiscal profligacy and benign neglect can only 
accelerate the rise of the euro as the alternative key currency in the world. The second is 
that the dollar standard may come to an end abruptly, followed by a sharp increase in U.S. 
interest  rates.  The  necessary  adjustment  would  then  entail  a  combination  of  a  sharp 
reduction in consumption and lower investment in the United States, prompting a deep 
recession.  The  rest  of  the  world  would  suffer  as  well,  especially  if  anti-globalization  
feelings in the U.S. Congress were to instigate a wave of protectionism. The third is the 
political  risk.  The  Chinese  government  has  the  resources  to  purchase  large  U.S. 
corporations in strategic sectors, such as energy and pharmaceuticals, or  with  established   23 
brand names (e.g., Coca Cola).
27 Governments have different motives than profit-minded 
private  actors;  and  authoritarian  governments  behave  differently  than  democratically 
elected governments. The U.S. government could resist a massive Chinese acquisition of 
US “industrial jewels.” Yet, the question must be raised about the bargaining power of the 
United States in preventing such acquisitions given that the Chinese are key buyers of the 
Federal debt. The continuation of  excessive U.S. consumption financed by low interest 
rate  capital  inflows  depends  on  Chinese  participation  at  U.S.  Treasury  auctions.  This 
means that U.S. economic policy is being  progressively constrained by  the undervalued 
Chinese exhange rate.   
An initial realignment of the dollar value of the renminbi and the establishment of 
target values of the exchange rates are parts of our proposal. While we have argued  that 
the  players  may  have  incentives  to  accept  such  changes,  one  must  underscore  the 
difficulty  of  achieving  cooperation  and  of  accepting  limitations  on  national  economic 
policy  making.    Permanent  changes  cannot  be  achieved  in  an  institutional  vacuum. 
Cooperation,  even  when  incentive  compatible,  requires  the  institutionalization  of 
objectives, ways, and means. In our proposal, New ICU  is not simply an office where to 
record  credit  and  debit  entries  of  the  supranational  bank  money.  New  ICU,  with  the 
agreement of the participating central banks, decides on SBM creation, size of the quotas, 
size and time length of the overdrafts, and the coordination of monetary policies. Not an 
easy task, yet feasible. Cooperation is a process. Participating countries need to learn to 
explore, in a sort of learning by doing, the domain over which cooperation is feasible. On 
                                                 
27 The process has already begun, in the summer of 2007, with government-controlled Chinese 
companies becoming sizeable owners, although without voting power, of  Blackstone, the U.S. 
private  equity  group  that  controls  U.S.  companies  with  very  large  employment.  Lawrence 
Summers (2007) puts it quite well when he warns that “Apart from the question of what foreign 
stakes would mean for companies, there is the additional question of what they might mean for 
host governments. What about the day when a country joins some “coalition of the willing” and 
asks the US president to support a tax break for a company in which it has invested? Or when a 
decision has to be made about whether to bail out a company, much of whose debt is held by an 
ally’s central bank?”   24 
that, we can gain insights from the history of the European Union, in general, and of 
European monetary unification, in particular. The European Monetary System was neither 
easy to create nor straightforward to run it. At the moment, cooperation among the Fed, 
the ECB, and the central bank of China looks  far fetched; in 1978, monetary cooperation 
among the participating countries of the European Monetary System appeared also far 
fetched. One may also argue that in a G-3 Accord, China is a strange bed fellow. Our 
answer is that it is time to ask China to play an international role commensurate with its 
economic power. China, now, is under-represented in international organizations.  
  Some caution is in order on what could be achieved by a tripartite agreement and 
the New ICU. The fragility of the current IMS reflects large external imbalance (flows) 
and large accumulated dollar reserves (stocks). We have emphasized fixing the flows 
before fixing the stock since both cannot be done simultaneously without disrupting the 
economies. It will take time to reabsorb the overhang of dollars. 
Finally, our proposal, like Keynes Plan, may have an inflationary bias. The danger 
is that the New ICU could be too lenient on the size of the overdrafts and the time period 
over which these need to be repaid. Overdrafts could be renewed to soften the harshness 
of the external constraint. We recognize this risk but point out that the alternative of 
pursuing the conservative strategy presents larger risks. No proposal can be panacea; ours 
is no exception. 
   25 
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Table 1 Current-account imbalances, billions of US dollars 
Country  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
United States  -415.2  -389  -472.4  -527.5  -665.3  -791.5  -856.7 
Euro Area  -41.3  3.2  42.2  35.5  97.5  8.1  -29.1 
United Kingdom  -37.6  -31.5  -24.8  -24.4  -35.4  -53.7  -68.1 
Japan  119.6  87.8  112.6  136.2  172.1  165.7  170.4 
China  20.5  17.4  35.4  45.9  68.7  160.8  238.5 
Russia  46.8  33.9  29.1  35.4  58.6  83.3  95.6 
Middle East  72.1  39.2  30  59.5  99.2  189  212.4 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2007. 
 
Table 2  U.S. current-account deficits and central bank financing, billions of US 
dollars 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Current-account deficit  417.4  384.4  459.6  522.1  640.1  754.8  811.5 
Increase  in  foreign 
official assets 
42.7  28  116  278  397.7  259.3  440.2 
Percentage  of  central 
bank financing 
10.2%  7.2%  25.2%  53.2%  62.1%  34.3%  54.2% 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Transactions.  28 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange 
Reserves and authors’ estimates.  
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Source:  Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve System, Trade Weighted Exchange 
Index –Major Currencies. The US dollar rose from 1978 (October) to March 1985; 
declined from March 1985 to the end of 1988 and, more modestly, from 1989 to 1995;  
rose from 1995 to September of 2001; and has declined since 2001. 
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